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Abstract
The pace of technological innovation since World War II is dramatically accelerating
following the commercial exploitation of the Internet. Since the mid 90’s fiber optics
capacity (infrastructure for transmission of information including voice and data) has
incremented over one hundred times thanks to a new technology, dense wave division
multiplexing, and Internet traffic has increased over 1.000 times. The dramatic
advances in information technology provide excellent examples of the critical
relevance of the knowledge in the development of competitive advantages. The
Silicon Valley (SV) that about fifty years ago was an agricultural region became the
center of dramatic technological and organizational transformations. In fact, most of
the present high-tech companies did not exist twenty years ago. Venture capital
contribution to the local economy is quite important not only due to the magnitude of
the financial investment (venture investment in SV during 2000 surpassed 25.000
millions of dollars) but also because the extent and quality of networks (management
teams, senior employees, customers, providers, etc.) that bring to emerging
companies. How do new technologies develop? What is the role of private and public
investment in the financing of R&D? Which are the most dynamical agents and how
do they interact? How are new companies created and how do they evolve? The
discussion of these questions is the focus of the current work.
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The dramatic advances in information technology (IT) bring sharp reductions of the time
for generating and implementing technological innovations into new products and
generate a sharp increase in competitive pressures and strategic uncertainties.
Competitiveness is not longer a macroeconomic phenomena determined by static
comparative advantages and industrial infrastructure. In contrast, advantages are
dynamically created and must be carefully preserved or are quickly lost. The capability of
agents to generate comparative advantages depends on how knowledge is generated,
processed and transmitted, and on the (economic and social) environment where agents
reside (Lundvall 1992, Lall 1995).
The capability to innovate becomes increasingly important for generating comparative
advantages and for reducing strategic uncertainties. Innovations may help designing new
products or improving existing ones. In addition, they may bring organizational
transformations and/or establish new relationships with the market. The capacity of
organizations to learn and adapt to take advantage of innovations is of vital importance.
High-tech firms usually generate both formal and informal knowledge as they evolve.
The potential of organizations for transforming generic knowledge into specific
(applicable to the production process) is vital for generating competitive advantages. On
the other hand, not every agent is capable of providing adequate responses to rapidly
changing technologies and business conditions. Learning processes require a minimum
threshold of capacities and competencies. As we discuss below, these requirement are
less critical in certain positive local environments such as the Silicon Valley (SV).
The local institutions, agents and the interrelation among them compose a local
environment.  The creation of competitive advantages by agents strongly influences the
degree of development of the local environment in which these agents act. A local
environment can be considered as a "public space" (social capital) which, when highly
positive, gives rise to processes of collective efficiency (Camagni 1991, Bianchi y Miller
1994, Morgan 1995). In the SV the positive environment manifest itself in a dynamics
with a diversity of agents who cooperate and compete. Interactions among these agents
generate a collective tension that i) favors the development of strategies of innovation, ii)
minimizes the difference between agents, iii) reduces strategic uncertainties, iv) reduces
weakness of organizational cultures v) reinforces learning processes vi) provides missing
competencies vii) contributes to the process of diffusion of knowledge (Camagni 1991).
In the new international scenario local environment and global economy are not opposite.
The strength of globalization resides in the complexity of knowledge and in the synergy
that results from competitive confrontations of different geographical areas with their
own networks of agents. To measure the value of their specificities (knowledge,
capabilities, etc.) local and national spaces need to be compared to others at a global
scale. This confrontation may serve as catalysis for accelerating processes of conversion
of knowledge from tacit to codified
1, and for generating new knowledge (Lundvall 1992,
                                             
1  Codified knowledge includes technological and organizational knowledge that can be
transferred in the market. In turn, tacit knowledge includes: i) knowledge not codified in books or2
Ernst y Lundvall 1997, Rullani 1997, Ducatel 1998, Poma 1998). For example, tacit
elements have a strong empirical component, thus the geographical localization has
importance in the generation of this type of knowledge. The experimental, empirical and
conceptual nature of learning processes helps to create tacit knowledge and also to codify
it for transforming, processing and transferring it. In this way, knowledge can circulate
from a context to another assuming a more universal form. On the other hand, for
knowledge to be effectively applied in another context it must be de-codified (Becattini y
Rullani 1997, Poma 2000, Boscherini y Yoguel 2000). This process of codification and
de-codification of knowledge that relates the local and global environments is usually
known as versatile integration. The Silicon Valley constitutes an example of local system
of versatile integration that additionally presents two positive aspects: constitutes an
advanced local system and specializes in information technology.
This work discusses the economic relevance of the SV in the West Coast of the United
States, and shows the strong relation between the performance of the local firms with
their previous history and with the evolution of the local system of innovation. Firms,
universities, federal laboratories strongly interact among themselves and with groups of
agents. In turn, agents act as connectors and catalyze the generation and circulation of
tacit and codified knowledge. This work also shows the critical importance of learning
processes, which become the most important competitive advantage of the area. The first
section focuses on the importance of knowledge as enabler of competitive advantages.
Section II discusses Silicon Valley as a virtuous local environment.  Section IIII focuses
on innovation and the learning process in the SV. Finally conclusions are presented.
1. Knowledge as Enabler of Competitive Advantages
The tremendous advances in information technology (IT) since World War II originated
from rapid progress in three IT components: transportation (bandwidth), capacity of
processing (computational power) and storage capacity (memory technology). During the
last 30 years (since the invention of the integrated circuit) the processing power and
storage capacity have dramatically increased giving rise to sharp reductions in the price
for processing and storing of data 
2/
3/. Moreover, in the last six years we have witness
revolutionary advances in fiber optics that have increased the information transported via
fiber by two orders of magnitude (a factor of one hundred).
                                                                                                                                      
manuals ii) empirical knowledge, iii) capacity of solving problems not codified iv) capacity to relate
problems to analog situations. While the codified elements of the knowledge process are
transable, the tacit component is firm specific, and cannot be bought in the market. It constitutes
a technological/organizational competitive advantage of a firm, region or country.
2 In the middle 60's and shortly after the invention of the integrated circuit, Gordon Moore, one of
the founders of Intel proposed the following empirical law (later known as Moore's law): the
number of transistors per processor duplicates every 18 months. For example, the number of
transistors of an Intel X86 chip, the most common chip used by a PC goes from 29 thousand in
1978 to 7.5 millions in 1997.This number gives a good idea of the processing capacity of a chip
(or the storing capacity of a memory). This empirical law has worked for over 35 years, although
more recently the duplication occurs every 24 months.
3 The ratio price vs. performance for microprocessors and memories has been improving about
50% per year during the last 30 years.3
Since the mid 90’s there has been an accelerated replacement of the telephone
infrastructure (circuit-switched technology) for that of the Internet (packet-switching
4
technology). The explosive growth of the Internet in the last few years, and the
deregulation of markets in the telecom industry significantly accelerated these changes
5
and the following trends have emerged a) convergence of the telecom (voice) with the
datacom (data) infrastructures using Internet technology, b) creation of large number of
start-ups that generated most of the technological innovations, c) development of
strategic alliances, and d) process of acquisition, fusion and consolidation of the industry
towards one-stop shopping.
The arrival of the Internet has broken the previous status quo in the telecom and
information
6 markets, led respectively by AT&T for almost 100 years, and by IBM for
over 50 years. In every segment new actors have emerged producing a much larger and
segmented market. In fact, most of the high-tech companies that now dominate the US
economy did not exist twenty years ago.
7 This dynamics takes place in an environment of
high uncertainty, such that the one that "hit the target" first has a much higher reward
(and risk) that those that did it in the past in a much more stable environment with a
“linear” innovation processes. Agents now need to make decisions in an uncertain
environment with imperfect information and limited rationality, as the neoschumpeterian
framework shows.
Some of these profound transformations have highly affected the telecom industry
modifying price structures and business models. For example, just a few years ago (with
circuit-switched technology) the price of long distance phone calls was determined in
function of duration, time of the day and distance. In contrast, in the future (with packet-
switched technology) time of the day and distance may not be as relevant anymore. The
phone companies, either alone or as part of a chain of providers will offer a variety of
options (prices) for use of their infrastructure based on quality of service which will have
as one of their components regular phone calls with the costs of calls only weakly
dependent of distance. In addition, they will include other services such as interactive
TV, videoconference, internet access, e-commerce infrastructure, video rental, interactive
education, games via Internet, etc.
                                             
4 While the circuit-switched technology establishes an exclusive communication between emitter
and receptor, in the packet-switched technology the transmitted information is segmented in small
packets that travel independently towards the receptor. The packet-switched technology is much
more efficient for short and highly interactive communications typical of internet sessions.
5 Notice that in standard phone technology there are two methods for establishing connections. In
the inband signaling, the cable used for transmission of voice is the same as that for establishing
the connection. In contrast, in the outband signaling packet-switched technology is used to
establish connections.
6 The information industry (and IBM in particular) were already disrupted by (and speed of
innovation that heavily accelerated since) the introduction of the personal computer (PC) in the
early 80’s.
7 These companies include Microsoft, Cisco, Intel, Oracle, America Online, Qwest among
others.4
Work is now related to projects that appear/disappear in the context of a dramatic
reduction of the life-cycle of products, which in the area of information technology has
gone from 5-7 years a decade ago to 7-8 months today. In this direction, lifetime jobs at a
given company are almost gone. This is due to the fact that natural unit of work for
companies are 2-3 years projects that require certain technical expertise. Team members
are usually recruited both, in-house and from outside. Companies can now satisfy their
critical needs with specialized personnel, who are not necessarily local, and/or take
advantage of differences in workers’ salaries with similar competencies but at different
geographical locations. A consequence of this process is the externalization (outsourcing)
extended to the entire world. Companies of the SV and a few countries such as Israel,
Taiwan, India, and Ireland take advantage of these tendencies. These countries have
developed highly trained personnel that participate in the dynamics of the SV (and others
high-tech centers) in certain areas such as software, hardware, communications as
contractors or employees of local companies, or through their own companies as
providers to local companies. Also alternative forms of engagement are encouraged such
as part-time contractors and telecommuting workers. Internet technology, in fact, is
allowing collaboration at distance (geographical de-localization) with workers around the
globe working on a single project.
The rapid transition towards an economy of information (services, software,
communication, etc.) has important technological, social and legal impact. This generates
challenging problems as there is not yet a well-established methodology for measuring
the “value” of emerging technologies and of new products that are already dominating the
USA economy. Moreover, it is not even clear yet how to profit from the Internet (e.g.,
Amazon.com). Finally, there is not a well-defined framework to determine the ownership
of knowledge (e.g., Napster). The new information economy suffers from deficiencies of
the educational system that cannot satisfy current demands nor provide training required
by the industry. Finally, society is slow to adapt to changes, and although IT can
potentially reduce the gap between rich and poor and provide tools for a more open and
democratic society, in short term it appears that the gap is growing. These enormous
challenges that must be resolved in a near future are unlikely to stop the long-term grow
tendency fueled by the Internet but surely they will generate crisis and uncertainty.
2.  Silicon Valley (SV) as a Virtuous Local Environment
2.1 Basic Data
The Silicon Valley (SV) is located in Santa Clara County, about 70 kilometers south of
San Francisco and 670 kilometers north of Los Angeles and occupies an area of about
1.300 square kilometers. The SV’s population grew almost 300% from about 0.6 million
in 1960 to about 1.7 million in 1999. The cities of San José, Sunnyvale and Santa Clara
concentrate almost 60% of the county. The rest of the population lives in smaller towns
including Mountain View, Palo Alto (where the University de Stanford is located),
Milpitas, Cupertino, Campbell, Saratoga and Los Gatos. The city of San José with a5
population of over 0.9 million is already the 11
th largest city of the country, and the third
most populated center of California. Over 25% of the population of the SV comes from
other countries, in particular from Asia (China, India, Vietnam, Philippines, etc.), Mexico
and Central America.
At the beginning of the 90's - before the internet boom of the last decade - the SV
concentrated 13% (1.5%) of all industrial jobs of California (USA), and similar
proportion of sales. These were very high percentages considering that the local
population represented 6.2% of California’s and 0.7% of that of the country. The local
share of the US industrial jobs has increased even further in the 90's due to a much faster
local growth than that of the State and of the country propelled by the Internet revolution.
(The rate of growth has slowed down in 2000.) This is validated by the fact that the
number of industrial jobs per 1000 inhabitants in SV duplicates that of the California and
US. The economic activity of SV is outstanding not only for the development of
information technology, but also because of a highly dynamical internal market. For
example, per capita annual retail sales has increased by a factor of 8 in the last 30 years.
In addition, job productivity was over 120 thousand dollars per worker, 50% above the
US ratio.
Below we present some charts with information on the performance of the top 150
companies in the Silicon Valley at the end of the 90’s. This only includes companies
whose headquarters are located in the area, so it does not consider a large number of
others (such as IBM, Microsoft, etc.) with large operations in SV but headquarters
elsewhere. As it can be seen from Table 1, the 20 largest companies concentrated most of
the sales (76%). In average, sales of the top 150 companies were about 1.265 million
dollars, with large differences between the first 20 companies (7.439 millions) and the
remaining ones. In spite of this strong concentration, there were over 120 local companies
with sales above 100 million, giving rise to a critical mass of important agents. This
concentration trends are weakened by the continuous and rapid incorporation of start-ups
to the local economy.













Over 1500 20 12.9 148.788 75.9 7.439
1000-1499 9 5.8 10.805 5.5 1.201
500-999 26 16.8 17.562 9.0 675
300-499 18 11.6 6.526 3.3 363
100-299 76 49.0 12.041 6.1 158
less than 100 6 3.9 368 0.2 61
Total 155 100.0 196.090 100.0 1.265
Source: Own, based on Mercury News data.6
Currently, SV industry is highly diversified. Main areas of activity include datacom,
semiconductors and software. Semiconductors (Intel, AMD, National Semiconductors,
Linear Technologies, etc.) and related equipment (KLA Tencor, Lam Research, Applied
Materials, etc.) account for over 25% of the sales. Software (Oracle, Adobe, Intuit, etc.)
represents about 15% and datacom (Cisco, 3Com, Juniper, etc.) accounts for over 10%.
The remainder includes computers (e.g., Hewlett-Packard and Sun), memories (e.g.,
Seagate), Medical equipment and biotechnology (e.g., Agilent, Genetech, Chiron, Alza )
and Internet (e.g., Netscape/AOL and Yahoo) among other sectors. Market segments are
highly interrelated and with high variations in their scale of operations. For example
average sale per firm ranges from just above 100 million (e.g., biotechnology) to over
10.000 (e.g., computers). Table 2 gives the sale distribution per sector of the top 150 SV
companies at the end of the 90’s.7
Table 2. Distribution of sales per sector of the 150 largest SV companies (average sale in
millions, 1998 US dollars)
Sector % total firms % total sales Average sale per
firm
Semiconductors 7.8 19.2 536
Software 19.2 14.1 1.811
Others 8.2 10.3 1.056
Telecom 1.4 10.3 182
Semiconductor Equipment 4.0 7.1 760
Others High-Tech 2.5 6.4 511
Computers 32.0 3.8 11.028
Disks/Memories 8.0 3.8 2.753
Medical Equipment 0.8 3.8 259
Internet 0.7 3.8 248
Manufacturing Services 3.6 3.2 1.504




Software Edutainment 0.5 1.3 473
High-Tech Services 0.6 1.3 630
Medicinal Labs 0.3 1.3 330
Biotechnology 0.1 0.6 135
Source: Own, based on Mercury News data.
2.2 Origin of The Local Environment
The SV was an agricultural region, with a small agro-industrial activity that processed
and distributed food until the 30’s. Frederick Terman, an engineering professor from
Stanford University had a big impact in the creation and development of the earliest high-
tech firms in the area. In fact, Terman is known as the "father of the Silicon Valley" as he
actively worked for the creation of networks involving private firms, Stanford University
and the Government.
The creation of Litton Industries in 1932, of Hewlett-Packard in 1937 and of Varian
Associates in 1948, all of them with strong relationship to Stanford signaled a dramatic
change in the evolution of the local economy then moving toward a high-tech future and
also marking the beginning of the end of the agricultural economy.  This emerging high-
tech industry greatly benefited from the World War II demand of electronic equipment
(radar, electronic systems, electronic devices, etc.). The new companies established an
informal business environment that contrasted with that of the East. Main characteristics
included a strong reliance in technological innovations, minimization of bureaucracies
and emphasis on community outreach. In addition to local firms the SV benefited from
the installation of large laboratories by leading companies headquartered in the East such
as IBM, Westinghouse, Philco-Ford and Sylvania in the 50's and 60's.8
It is of paramount importance the creation of Fairchild Semiconductor, the first
semiconductor plant to produce transistors. The main impact of Fairchild has not only
been the technological innovation of producing transistors, but the generation of a large
number of "Fairchildren", high caliber engineers that left the company to start their own
companies. Many of the largest semiconductor companies in the SV today had
"Fairchildren" as founders. This flourishing activity generated a very high demand for
engineers stopping the "brain drain" towards the East, and later on inverting the flow. In
the history of the SV, Fairchild is seen as a university that formed hundreds of engineers
that later established their own companies 
8/. This role of Fairchild in the 70's is
replicated by Apple in the 80's and early 90's, with the Apple children founding several
multimedia and Internet companies.
After contributing to the World War II effort from Harvard, Terman returned to the West
Coast in 1946 as a dean of the School of Engineering and actively continued his
unfinished project to transform the now SV in a center of excellence initially trying to
catch up with the East Coast. As before he emphasized the interconnection between
business and high technology, and the role of university research to solve technological
problems. To accomplish these goals he contributed to the creation of several institutions
for strengthening the interaction between academia and industry including:  i) Stanford
Research Institute, which focused in applied research and very close collaboration with
local industry, ii) Honors Cooperative Programme, that established a bridge between
academia and industry, and among other activities provided a program to train employees
of local companies in new technological advances and, iii) Stanford Industrial Park, one
of the first industrial parks of the country encouraging local companies to place their
facilities in a large area own by the university and rented to local companies. Military
contracts during the 50's contributed to the expansion of the park. Already in the 50's
Stanford had a number of Ph.D. students in Electrical Engineering comparable with that
of MIT. At the end of the 60's the SV was already known as an important center of
electronic and aero-spatial industry
At the beginning of the 70's and due to the large impact of the semiconductor industry in
the local economy, the region began to be known as the Silicon Valley. In fact, SV hosted
40 out of the 45 semiconductor plants installed in the US between the end of the 50's and
the mid-70's. This large concentration of high-tech firms favored the development of
spin-off and start-ups, and the emergence of an important market for venture capitalists.
In the mid 70's there were about 150 high-tech companies in the region and over 100
thousand people working in the high-tech industry. The local dynamism generated an
environment where companies were created independent of military contracts as source
of financing. The excellence of this environment was only equated by that of the Boston
area (around Highway 128). There, the most dynamic company and engine of the region
was Digital Equipment (DEC) which focused in minicomputers. On the other hand, there
was a very important cultural different between the East and West Coast firms 
9
                                             
8 Among the best-known companies founded by "Fairchildren" one must mention Intel, National
Semiconductors, AMD and LSI Logic.
9 These differences are the focus of an excellent book of Saxenian (1994). See references.9
While the East coast companies were mainly financed with military funds promoting
secrecy and relative isolation of the firms, the SV received a much smaller fraction of
military and government spending. Survival skills in rapidly changing technologies and
assurance of private funds required strong interaction and collaboration among local
firms. In addition, the local geography and the physical proximity of firms helped to
develop both a formal and informal communication among companies and other local
organizations.
During the early 80's several semiconductor products manufactured in the SV (memory
chips in particular) became commodities, and Japanese companies began dominating
large fraction of the market. This started a deep recession both, in the East Coast
(Highway 128) and in the SV. The worst point of the recession in the SV was reached in
1984. At this point many analysts compared the destiny of the semiconductor industry
with that of the automobile industry, which, at that time, had been aggressively taken by
Japanese firms.
10 The widespread opinion then was that the network system of the SV
was not strong enough to resist Japanese competition. The initial response of the local
companies was to associate the Japanese comparative advantages with the lower relative
salaries paid by Japanese firms. It later become clear that the advantage was not in lower
salaries nor in government protection but in the synergy of the collective action of
enterprises and other private and public organizations, and to the reduced cost of credit
that the Japanese firms enjoyed.
How did the SV react to this serious crisis? The semiconductor industry at that time
consisted not only of the production of semiconductor memories but other semiconductor
technologies were emerging. Engineers from large companies (Intel, National, AMD,
etc.) reacting to bureaucracies in their organizations that slowed or stopped the
development of these new technologies began to abandon their companies to start their
own firms. These events together with the restructuring of large companies are the basic
elements that helped the SV to recuperate from the crisis and begin a very sustained
growth that continued til the end of the 90’s. By the end of the 80's the SV had already
surpassed Highway 128 as the center for innovation in information technology.
In 1976 Apple Computers is created and then delivers two revolutionary products: i)
Apple II introduced in 1977 is the first personal computer (PC) that receives massive
acceptation giving rise to the highly dynamic PC industry, and ii) the Apple Macintosh in
1984 that brought the technological advances that PCs are utilizing still today (graphical
interface, mouse, icons, menus, windows, etc.). Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak founders
of Apple quickly became folk heroes in the valley (and later the rest of the world). This is
the origin of a culture of admiration of young entrepreneurs and new technologies and
that inspired many young people to consider technology as an exciting career. Probably
the biggest revolution of Apple Computers has been to convert the PC in a tool of
massive use. In turn, Apple introduced a new philosophy in the valley combining
                                             
10 In this period Japanese investors acquired the Rockefeller Center. This event was
considered by many as a symbol of US decadence.10
engineering elements with a strong artistic flavor, and creating a culture with
hippies/yuppies ingredients.
The effects of the crisis of the 80's were harsh and lasting. This affected the confidence of
the SV about its potential for growth (which before the crisis was thought to be
unbounded). In addition, it generated a critique to the excessive bureaucratic tendencies
in the large firms. On the other hand, this did not affect the open culture, the practices of
cooperation among diverse agents and the notion that not success is a learning
opportunity rather than a failure. In 1994 Netscape Communications is created to
commercialize the web browser. This created the industry of the Internet launching the
SV and then the rest of the world into the most dramatic revolution. In the 90's the
Internet economy began to dominate the valley economy providing a recovery of the
spirit of the 60's and 70's that had been lost for almost a decade. The new industrial
structure that has been generated is much more diverse than that of 2 decades before, and
includes not only semiconductors but other industries such as software (databases, CAD
tools, games, etc.), internet, biotechnology and communication (see Table 2).
Progress (of the SV and of the high-tech industry) is not linear. In fact, crisis and
restructuring are integral part of their dynamics.  Several factors explain the new crisis
that started in the year 2000. Main factors include very high valuation of high-tech
companies with price to earning (P/E) ratios sometimes more than 10 times above typical
values before 1994, doubts about the capacity of dot-coms to earn money (e.g.,
Amazon.com) and, more generally, uncertainty about how to commercially exploit
Internet’s huge potential. The 2000-2001 crisis initially affected dot-coms (which are just
the most visible but small component of the Internet, a very complex system) but later
propagated to other high-tech sectors. This crisis should not be understood as the end of
the growing cycle fueled by the Internet revolution, which is dramatically transforming
the economy and society. Instead, it should be viewed as (a short-term) restructuring of
the industry to better adjust to dramatic and little understood changes brought by
revolutionary technologies with yet to be defined business models.
2.3. Main Characteristics of the SV as a Virtuous Local Environment
What is the dynamics of the SV? How can firms quickly adapt to frenetic changes in
technologies and business conditions? A positive environment that promotes collective
learning, discussion and confrontation of ideas without respecting company boundaries
plays a critical role in the creation and development of local firms. A positive
environment encourages collaboration not only among firms related through the
production chain (suppliers and providers), but also among competitors developing new
technologies and opening new markets. Moreover, a positive environment promotes
flexibility and adaptation to fast changing market conditions.
In first place, there is in the SV an important critical mass of firms with heterogeneous
modes of production and little vertical integration with a wide range of high-tech
specialization including internet, semiconductors, semiconductor equipment, computers,
memories, software, telecommunication, network equipment and biotechnology.
Companies compete and collaborate, learning from each other about changes in market11
conditions and the state of art of relevant technologies. There are both, formal and
informal channels of communications within a firm and among firms. Also there is
usually a strong interaction with other agents some of which may be outside the regional
system (such as other non-local firms, universities and research laboratories, venture
capital, etc.).
In the 60's and 70's most large companies of the SV (e.g., National Semiconductors, …)
had a high-degree of vertical integration. This promoted isolation inside companies and
inside departments within companies and, of course, even more among firms. In spite of
that temporary "deviation" the SV has been an "open" system, it could even be thought as
a "single company” with a very strong interaction among various agents. The cooperation
among agents may be, for example, to guarantee interoperability among various
competing technologies to enable exchange of parts/products and usually to open new
markets that require a critical mass of consumers. Because of specialization and high
interdependencies of a firm with its suppliers and clients, strong collaboration among
these parties is a must in an economic environment where time to market is so critical
that being late a couple of months could kill a product or even a company.
The flexibility of the system, standardization of sub-assembly and parts and the non-
vertical nature of organizations enable the creation of modules of hardware and software
produced by large number of agents. These conditions allow for design and
manufacturing of new products at very fast pace and creation of new markets supported
by fast learning curve. Learning processes are based on data from a large variety of new
product offerings targeting similar needs, and on responses of the market to various
alternatives. This "quick experimentation" of the system to test different emerging
technologies, assembling a variety of products based on these technologies and rapidly
bringing these products to market provides critical input to guide flexible firms (and the
local system) in a highly uncertain environment.
We must note that although there are common cultural characteristics shared by agents in
the local system (which make the SV valley an open, flexible and fast learning local
system), there are also cultural peculiarities associated to different firms and groups
(ethnical, professional, etc.). Thus, we could distinguish several "company subcultures"
which differ in a) hierarchical structure of organizations b) human resource policies for
retention, job rotation, etc. c) degree of "patriotism" or involvement in company's
principle or doctrine.
Some companies have a strong engineering culture and place a strong emphasis in
gaining employee's fidelity in spite of their large size (Hewlett-Packard, Linear
Technologies). Others mix artistic ingredients with engineering excellence and tend to
have a hippie-yuppie culture (Apple). Some companies have many descendents
(Fairchild, Apple)  which, in some cases, preserve "parent's religion" (such as anti-Gates
culture of earlier Apple children). Some firms combine engineering culture with strong
defense of their secrets and some control elements (such as cards registering employee's
arrival and departure time, e.g., Intel). Other firms combine the "religious struggle" in the
market with "political" alliances with other smaller parties (Oracle). In contrast, another12
companies resemble a "Roman Empire" absorbing large number of start-ups and smaller
companies, but respect, to some degree, their internal cultures (Cisco) thus keeping not
only their technology and IP (intellectual property) but also most of their people. This is
in contrast to other more painful absorption of start-ups that retains only IP but
“accelerates” the departure of critical people of the incorporated firm (such as earlier
IBM acquisition policies). In most companies (if not all) in the SV, it is common that as
the company reaches some critical size or stage, some of the leading technical and/or
business people leave to start new companies. Some independent wealthy people may
remain in their alma-matter (either in the management team or as a technical fellow) but
invest money in start-ups of friends as angels or contribute to VC funds. Some of these
people also become venture capitalist.
In spite of all these peculiarities, the culture of the SV rewards risk-taking individuals,
but make risk-taking much easier that elsewhere. This is because no success in an
endeavor is not viewed as negative but as a good opportunity for learning. In essence the
culture of SV is that change is permanent and it is necessary to adapt fast to survive.
Thus, even when one "dies" moving in the "wrong" direction, one's capacity of learning
is very valued.
One of the main ingredients to generate such virtuous local system in the SV is the
presence of large number of agents who accelerate the flow of information. Usually they
know each other because of sharing activities (attend same university, work at the same
company, attend same church, meet at conferences, gyms or bars 
11/) and interact in
multiple ways.  These agents are either individuals (venture capitalists, engineers,
business people, lawyers, etc.) or organizations (professional organizations such as IEEE,
ACM and APS, ethnical organizations, universities, etc.). Agents generate and transform
information that a) may influence decisions within a firm or relationship of the firm with
others, b) generate relationships among agents, c) destroy relationships d) created
interactions among agents with incomplete and contradictory information and e) connect
different levels of abstractions. On the other hand, as the number of agents is large and
the type of information they transmit is heterogeneous, the resultant is a collection of
signals sent to the market. Although information is distorted as it propagates, many times
purposely for opportunistic reasons, the overall effect of this dynamics is to accelerate
diffusion of knowledge, generate networks that dynamically may reconfigure and adapt
to very fast changes in the environment, and become the source of new businesses. Arno
Penzias (see Box 1) is an example of an outstanding agent.
Box 1 Dr. Arno A. Penzias, Physics Nobel Prize and Venture Capitalist
He was born in Germany 1933 and was educated in US. Dr. Penzias began his scientific
career in Bell Labs in 1961 working in the field of radio communications. He is best
known for his work in radio astronomy that led to the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1978.
                                             
11 Informal discussions help agents to understand current events in the SV and in the
rest of the world. In these discussions they may get revealing information, say, about
their customers, competition, emerging technologies and markets.13
His found a very strong evidence to support the Big-Bang theory which explains the
origin of the universe. Dr. Penzias held technical and managerial positions, and helped
to transform Bell Labs from a organization centered around classical academic
disciplines to one focused on strategic emerging technologies. In the late 90’s, he
moved to the Silicon Valley. Currently Dr. Penzias is a partner of the venture capital
firm New Enterprise Associates (NEA).
He says that basic research is NOT the opposite of applied research, but non-applied is,
instead. Thus, it is necessary to find a good synthesis between academic (basic) research
and industry needs. To this purpose, one must avoid "non-applied" research centered
around writing many papers that very few read, use or understand. On the other hand, it
is important to change the short-sighted view of most corporate managers whose
strategic views do not go beyond a trimester and who consider research (basic or
applied) a waste of time/resources.
The interactions among agents and the implicit existence of an "engineers federation"
breaks with the traditional individual firms, and generates a fuzzy boundary within and
among firms. Engineers that belong to the "federation" or network have a stronger
relationship among themselves (sometimes in competing organizations) than with
colleagues of the same firm. Similarly, large companies are many time partitioned in
autonomous units, then a given unit may have a weaker relationship with another unit
than with the corresponding unit of a competitor.
Then, the Valley can be thought as a single modular and flexible company with many
coordinators and with high mobility, strong connection among parts but quick
morphological changes (some parts break down, others join together, some appear and
others disappear). The dynamics of incremental innovation is insufficient to stay in the
market for too long, and formal and informal networks play a critical role in the
generation and diffusion of knowledge and in the creation and destruction of business
opportunities.
Radical innovations may change the nature of businesses. These innovations are
generated either in start-ups or within a small innovative group in a large firm. In the SV
system dynamics, radical innovations in large firms are associated with either tendency to
externalize (spin-off group with revolutionary technology) or absorb from the market
(acquire start-ups or their technology).  This (non-linear) dynamics manifests itself in the
continuous process of fusion and/or acquisition of firms. In very few cases from the
radical innovation processes new companies have emerged and quickly dominated new
markets (such as Microsoft, Sun and Cisco).  Usually new successful start-ups (with their
technological innovations) are absorbed by large companies that dominate the market and
are the de-facto coordinators of the system (e.g., Cisco).14
In addition to individual agents, local organizations (educative, service, professional, …)
have a very important role in the generation of a local system of excellence. 
12/. These
institutions usually complement each other and may benefit from strong interrelationships
between private firms with state and federal funded organizations. In particular, in the last
few years there has been a special effort by local and federal government in encouraging
and supporting the development of high-tech start-ups. In addition, the educational
organizations strongly encourage the coordination of research problems with industrial
needs (see Box 2).
Box 2 Dr. John L. Hennessy. Dean of Engineering at Stanford
Dr. Hennessy is the Dean of the School of Engineering of the University of Stanford. He
is also a leading figure in computer architecture. During his sabbatical in 1984/5 he co-
founded MIPS Computer System, currently known as MIPS Technologies Inc.
This company specializes in the production of chips and related intellectual property
using technology based on the research of his group at Stanford. He encourages faculty
and students to get involved with local industry. He says that "this is the way to
approach Stanford researchers to the real-world ", and that "technology thrown over the
wall in form of publications many times is sterile and dies without affecting the world”.
As additional examples of the dynamics between Stanford and local start-ups one must
mention Andreas Bechtolsheim, co-founder of Sun Microsystems (1982), and Sandra
Lerner and Leonard Bosack, founders of Cisco Systems (1984). In the mid 90’s
Stanford graduate students created Yahoo. The market value of these 3 companies (Sun,
Cisco and Yahoo) reached about 500 thousand millions of dollars at the end of the 90’s.
The local system does not accept demand passively. On the contrary, it has an active role
in the development or induction of demands, which allows it to escape from commodity
                                             
12  Among institutions and agents that have significant role in the Silicon Valley one
must mention Journals: Mercury News, The Business Journal of San Jose; Museums
and Bookstores: Museum of Technology and Innovation, Intel Museum and Fatbrain, a
bookstore with extension activities; Universities and Laboratories:  University of
Stanford, University of Santa Clara, University of San Jose, University of California at
Berkeley and at Santa Cruz , Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Lawrence
Livermore  National Laboratory, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, NASA; Organizations: Bay Area
Regional Technology Alliance (BARTA), Churchill Club, MIT/Stanford Venture Laboratory, Software
Developer Forum, The Jewish High-Tech Community, Chinese Software Professionals Association, The
IndUS Entrepreneurs, Silicon Valley Computer Society, Graphics Art Association, Silicon Valley
Computer Society, Wireless Communication Alliance, California Venture Forum, Silicon Valley
Association of Software Entrepreneurs (SVASE), Silicon Valley Indian Professionals Association (SIPA),
The Berkeley Entrepreneurs Forum; Professional Organizations: Bay area chapters of Institute of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), Association of Computer Machinery (ACM), American Institute of
Physics, American Chemical Society; Incubators: The Enterprise Network, Center for Entrepreneurial
Development, Communication Technology Cluster, Mountain View Multimedia Incubator, Tri-Valley
Technology Enterprise Center, Digital Village; Conference Centers: Santa Clara Convention Center, San
Jose Convention Center; and Service Providers: PricewaterhouseCooper LLP, Emerging Companies
Services, Garage.com, HiTech Law, Band of Angels.15
markets, and focuses on the most profitable phases of the productive cycle. In this regard,
the role of the good VCs and other agents can be viewed as promoters of new demands
and connectors of the various pieces of the puzzle to solve new problems opening new
markets.
In the period 1996-1999 venture capitalist (VC) in the SV financed 3076 companies of
high-tech, investing about 26.500 million of dollars. More than half of this amount has
been invested just in 1999. Table 3 show that the number of companies created in 1999 is
86% superior to that of 1996. On the other hand, the amount invested grew at the much
higher rate of 400%. Thus, the average amount invested per company increased from 6.7
millions in 1996 to 10.8 millions in 1999. There are two important tendencies: a) there
has been a relative increase of the weight of the SV in the total amount invested by
venture capital in the U.S. (from 28% in 1996 to 39% in 1999), and related the this, b)
there have been a very strong investment on internet projects which have reached in 1999
about 66% of the total VC investment in SV.
Table 3. Venture Capital Investment in the Silicon Valley (base 1996=100)




% Total U.S. VC
investment
1996 100 100 28
1997 120 160 32
1998 143 200 31
1999 186 600 39
2000 230 1000 38
2001 * 150* 500 * 40.*
Source: Own, based on The Money Tree, Pricewaterhouse-Coopers
·  estimated
This tendency reached its peak in the year 2000 when VC investment in the SV was
about 25.000 million. This amount is a just a little less than the total VC investment in the
valley during the previous 4 years (1996-1999). Two records were reached in the second
quarter of 2000: the most VC investment per quarter and the highest valuation of the
high-tech companies. The period 1996-2000 has been highly anomalous as, among
others, there were almost no risks associated to (supposedly high-risk) VC investments.
In fact, most dot-coms companies created during that period (many of which either
became public after highly successful IPOs or were sold at high values) had not clear idea
on how to generate revenues. Company valuations merely reflected expected potential to
become substantial businesses. On the other hand, there was no known way to even
roughly estimate this potential. The NASDAQ went from a peak of over 5.200 in April
2000 to values below 2.000 in March 2001. VC investments in the SV during 2001 have
been projected to be about half of those the previous year. That value would be just 20%
below the 1999 figure but almost twice that of 1998. The reduction of total investment
would be accompanied by increase in investment per company.16
2.4 Interests of the SV: The New Political Agenda
Until recently high-tech companies of the SV were not usually
13 included in the political
agenda of the federal government reflecting a much stronger influence of the economic
interests of the East coast and of the oil (South) and automobile (Midwest) industries. As
the SV acquired an important relative weight in the U.S. economy, its political influence
increased dramatically. During the Clinton Administration, both the president and vice-
president visited the SV in large number of occasions. The SV is constantly receiving
visits of many republican and democrat politicians, and also of many personalities from
abroad. This interaction of the SV with the political class accelerated even more during
the 2000 presidential elections.
In the last decade there has been a change of attitude of both, politicians and SV leaders.
Politicians acquired a high respect for the SV as the engine for technological innovation
and economic growth.  SV leaders also have become increasingly active in politics
influencing at various governmental levels (federal, state and local) and pushing for an
agenda to benefit the SV industry. Most of the industry still focuses on narrow (and short-
term) issues affecting the SV valley and the high-tech industry.  They include rising the
cap on H1-B visas for skilled immigrants, liberalizing encryption and computer export
controls, making permanent the R&D tax credit for corporations, tax exemptions for
internet transactions (e-commerce) and granting China Permanent Normalized Trade
Relations.
Efforts to focus on other (longer term) critical issues are even more recent (e.g., TechNet
discussed below). These issues include reforming R&D tax credit so it applies to more
companies and stimulates industry-university relationship, increasing federal funding for
basic research, and addressing (K-12) education and training crisis.  Other highly critical
issues that impact both short and long term include anti-trust regulations (e.g., Microsoft
case) and intellectual property protection policy (e.g., Napster case).
The new role of the SV influencing the political agenda is reflected in a number of
organizations such as TechNet and PITAC (1999). TechNet is a bipartisan political
alliance of more than a hundred leading high-tech companies. John Doerr, a well-known
venture capitalist, is one of the founders of TechNet (see Box 3). PITAC [President’s
Information Technology Advisory Committee State] is an special committee
14 assembled
                                             
13 On the other hand some individuals from the SV had previously influenced Federal
Government policies and in some cases also occupied high-ranking public positions. For
example, David Packard, one of the founders of HP, was secretary of Defense during the Nixon
Administration in the period 1969-1971.
14 The industrial members of the PITAC include: Sun Microsystems, 3Com Corporation,
MCI Communication, PointCast Inc, Hughes Electronic Corp., Former Cray Research,
Microsoft Research, Walt Disney Imagineering, AT&T Labs, Intel Corp, Qualcomm,
CenterPoint Ventures and IBM17
by Clinton, former USA President to evaluate the federal and private research activities in
the area of Information Technology (IT) and had been mostly composed of SV leaders.
Although the main efforts of these groups are on short-term issues mentioned above, they
are concerned about long-term balanced economic growth exploiting technological
innovations associated with the Internet revolution.
Box 3 Profile of John Doerr, KPCB Partner: Political Agenda of the Valley
John Doerr was born in Saint Louis, Missouri and is 50 years old. He studied Electrical
Engineering at Rice University in Texas, and then received an MBA from Harvard. In
1974 he began working at Intel as an engineer, and in short time he became a top sales
executives of Intel. In 1980 he moved to KPCB (Kleiner Perkins Caufield and Byers),
one of the best-known venture capital firms. He is a highly successful partner at KPCB
and has led investments in Compaq, Sun Microsystems, Amazon.com, and Netscape
among others. He was affiliated to the Republican Party, but had close relationship with
leading democrats including Clinton and Gore. John believes that education needs to be
changed to adapt to demands of "new economy". He is one of the founders of TechNet
(Technology Network) that includes some of the most important high-tech companies of
the Valley. [Technet also includes well-known entrepreneurs such as Jim Barksdale
(former CEO de Netscape) y Art Levinson (CEO de Genentech, one of the most
important biotechnology companies).] John believes that the yesterday's R&D explains
today's innovations and that government investment in basic science and long-term
projects has been the driver for the current technological innovations.
These groups are proposing compromises between federal government and industry to
duplicate the financing of federal support for basic research in science, engineering and
technology in the next years. The groups also asked that the Government continue with a
tax break for investments in research by corporations. According to the commission " the
role of the federal government in the areas of R&D is critical and it cannot be replaced, in
particular, in areas in which short-term technological applications are unlikely. Moreover,
a high percentage of IT research that impacted most technological innovations of the last
30 years have come from academic institutions and national laboratories financed with
public funds by the federal government.
PITAC believes that required changes in the educational system benefit from larger
support of basic research by the government. In turn, industry demands for the next
decades requires to duplicate the number of students in engineering and sciences, which
in turn, requires to make the population sensible to this needs. According to PITAC the
federal government must keep and expand its leadership role supporting long-term
research in information technology (IT) since losing U.S. leadership in IT would have
dramatic economic consequences for the country. In this regard, advances in IT would
enable a strong infrastructure for businesses, scientific research and social integration,
thus constituting a fundamental pillar for progress in the XXI century. PITAC proposed
that to the already planned budget for the period 2000-2004, the government add 4500
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million dollars to be used in long-term IT projects by universities and federal
laboratories
15
The priorities selected are i) development of software to manipulate large amount of data
ii) improvement in human-computer interfaces iii) expansion and improvement of the
information infrastructure iv) development of IT to reduce the gap between information
rich and poor. To fulfill these objectives that would allow IT to become a powerful tool to
democratize the society, it is proposed that the NSF (National Science Foundation) takes
leadership in basic research on IT in collaboration with other research organizations such
as CIC (Computing Information and Communication) and HECC (High-End Computing
and Computation) and the development of interdisciplinary research groups.
In 2000, and in part as a result of PITAC’s findings, the government increased basic
research support for developing programs to promote technical careers and for
capacitating young people in new skills. 
16 In spite that the IT sector invest annually
about 30.000 million in R&D which is about twice the U.S. industry average (as fraction
of sales), PITAC is worry that the 50 largest IT companies have reduced the relative
R&D invested (as fraction of their total sales).
We are at the beginning of profound social and economic transformations fueled by the
Internet revolution. It is expected that pressure for both de-regulations and new
regulations will increase, as critical issues must be resolved in the coming years.
Changing regulations will heavily impact the high-tech industry. Main issues include
business models for profiting from the Internet, ownership of transformed knowledge
(patents, copyright, …), anti-trust regulations and financing of long-term (basic and
applied) research. In contrast to the short-term agenda that has substantial consensus,
some long-term issues promise to be much more conflictive since firms will be affected
in different ways (e.g., Microsoft and Napster cases).  This will required a dynamical
agenda, as neither solutions to critical issues nor even emerging problems are currently
known.
                                             
15 It is proposed that the increases in the budget progressively increase from about 450
millions in the year 2000 to about 1.400 millions in 2004. One must remember that the
additional 4.500 millions represents less than half (a fifth) of the 1999 (2000) VC
investment in the SV.
16 The 2000 budget gave the NSF a total of about 3000 million dollars, which
represented an increment of 5% respect to the 1999 budget. From this total, 400 million
corresponded to information technology to be used as recommended by PITAC. This is
the segment of the NSF budget that registered the largest increase (30%) respect to the
previous year.19
3. Innovation and the Learning Process in the Silicon Valley
3.1 The Importance of Codified and Tacit Knowledge
The circulation of (codified and tacit) knowledge constitutes a critical element for
learning, developing innovative processes and ideas, and thus for creating comparative
advantages. In the SV the informal interrelationship among agents constitutes an element
that greatly enables this circulation of knowledge.
The generation of new ideas and the cooperation among agents can only be understood
from the previous history. An impersonal memo has much less impact than information
associated with personal contacts. Similarly, formal meetings and structured groups are
many times unable to solve problems that are then solved in informal discussions (maybe
at a gym or a bar with either co-workers or friends from the competition). Then, as
companies recognize that informal sessions can be critical for incremental (and of course
revolutionary) advances, they try to change their organizational cultures to create more
opportunities to encourage activities that were previously considered a waste of time.
Hence, informal networks of employees and experts constitute a very important company
active. These networks are constituted by individuals that may share a specialization or
certain know-how and trust each other. These structures are not part of the company
organization chart. These groups help each other solving problems and exchanging useful
information and experiences, constituting communities of practice. In a sense, they can be
considered the basic incubators of knowledge, innovation and cooperation, and constitute
a fundamental assets that companies require to be successful in a new economic scenario
in which winning teams require more than the traditional capital, land and working hands.
17
The dynamics of (formal and informal) circulation of knowledge contributes to generate
incremental innovations in the SV. Most innovations are usually a sum of many
incremental ones and advances in existing processes and methodologies, start-ups in the
valley produce an important proportion of the total innovation in the region, and an even
much larger proportion of radical innovation. Start-ups heavily contribute to the
innovation process as it is much more difficult to generate innovation in large companies
with more rigid structures and complex procedures. Thus, large firms are usually slow to
take high-risk decisions. Many times start-ups are originated or financed by large
companies that are now well aware of their limitation to generate innovation. A few years
ago, large organizations were able to produce most of the innovation required to fuel their
                                             
17 The relevance assigned to knowledge as a fuel for the SV engine and the understanding that
there are problems that limit the efficiency of the (formal and informal) learning process led the
University of Berkeley (Hass School of Business) to create a degree to generate professionals
trained in facilitating the learning process.  This program has the contribution of Prof. Nonaka,
one of the best-known researchers in the knowledge economy.20
development at their own labs (some companies such as IBM and AT&T had first class
laboratories where fundamental technological and scientific development had taken
place). The relative importance of proprietary laboratories is quickly diminishing and
start-ups are becoming an important source of incremental and radical innovation.
There are four elements that accelerate the circulation of knowledge i) the existence of a
culture that encourages companies to "talk" with their competition ii) a very high job
mobility iii) projects as the de-facto units of work and iv) agents that transmit information
and connect demand with offer in different markets.
Firms "talk" fluidly with their competition for several reasons including the fast dynamics
of creation and evolution of technologies and the de-verticalization of the regional
economy (and also of the large companies). A large diversity of agents must
cooperate/coordinate to bring interoperating hardware and software modules to the
market. This creates the necessity of discussion forums, of standards accepted by
consumers and providers of modules, and of centers for learning new technologies and
for exchanging ideas. These dynamics develops with a background provided by the SV’s
culture that promotes strong interaction among agents.
The mobility in the job market is another element that contributes to knowledge
circulation. It is not common for a person to work all his/her life in a single company.
Typically one works 3 to 5 years at a given company until changes occur and better
opportunities appear elsewhere (maybe across the street). Many people consider that they
work in the SV but not for a given company. The natural units of work are projects with
workers sometimes more bounded to these projects than to particular companies. The
project conclusion brings a natural time to evaluate which next project is more
challenging or rewarding. The next project will not necessarily be at the same company,
but may include some of the same contributors.  In fact, engineers in the SV are more
loyal to their favorite technology sharing their passion within an engineering network.
Rather than remaining in a single company, they would pursue the most challenging
and/or rewarding project that advances the technology of their interest. Projects as unit of
work allows for a much faster adaptation to change, adding flexibility to the provision of
human resources and also allowing companies to quickly change and adapt.
Job rotation and a substantial demand for qualified workers have generated a very strong
competition for human resources. This was reflected in salaries much higher that those
for equivalent positions elsewhere and in healthy distribution of stock options. In general,
options during the 90’s became much more important than salaries.
 18 All of these have
contributed to increase the spending capacity of the local market generating a virtuous
                                             
18 Company employees excluding founders and CEO may own about 15% of the firm. At the end of 90’s,
15% of the market value of the most successful SV firms such as Yahoo and eBay gave an average of 16
and 35 million dollars per employee. The value of stock options has been greatly affected by the crisis that
started in 2000. For example, Yahoo’s stock in March 2001 were over 10 times lower that its peak about a
year earlier.21
cycle.
19 The crisis that started in 2000 will probably modify these characteristics in the
short-term.
3.2 The University-Enterprise Relationship
The generation and circulation of knowledge in the SV has greatly benefited from the
strong relationship between local firms and universities. On the contrary, relationships
between most U.S. universities and industries have usually been difficult during the
postwar period. The relationship of Stanford with the local industry started at the end of
the 30's and was reinforced after the Second World War. This relationship has served as
an example initially to other local universities, and more recently to universities
elsewhere in the country and rest of the world. In this section we briefly describe the
dynamics of the interaction university-industry in the Valley as well as in the rest of the
country.
One of the reasons for the difficult relationship between university-industry has been the
quite different scale of time in the processes of innovation between the two agents. This
is rapidly changing. While "long-term research" for the industry is moving from about 10
to 2 years or less, in academia is also changing from about 30-50 years to 10 years or
less. The relationship between industry and academia has evolved, and in the last fifty
years one can clearly distinguish two periods: a) Cold -War era, and b) post Cold War. In
the first period which extended from the end of the Second World War to the mid 80's
universities and national labs funding was provided mainly by the federal government
and was generally associated to Cold War U.S. policies. Thus, the connection between
both agents was weak and there was mutual mistrust. In contrast, in the second period
there is a much stronger need for collaboration. Universities and national laboratories
have seen a (sometimes sharp) reduction in public financing since the end of the Cold
War and are looking, in many cases encouraged by government, for financial support
from the private sector. In turn, the private sector needs help from academia for
innovation and for human resources capable to drive these innovation processes. Due to
the previous history of mistrust and lack of mutual understanding, the relationship
between the two agents has only been improving slowly.
The private sector views academic research as too theoretical, not relevant to industry's
problems, and of little application in the "real world". This perspective produced a
myopia towards understanding the technological relevance of important results generated
in the academic community. On the other hand, the relationship academia/industry has
been conditioned by the tradition of older and mid-aged generations of researchers who
                                             
19 The tremendous growth of the Valley in the 80’s and 90’s also brought undesired
consequences such as a very high cost of living, sharp increase in traffic and other
unwanted factors that have decreased the quality of life in the area.22
disregard problems in the industry as too particular, not challenging enough for serious
scientist and technologists, and of very little generality.
20
Changes in regulations since the 80's promoted the collaboration of universities and
national labs with private companies. The largest federal agencies supporting research
such as NSF (National Science Foundation), NIST (National Institute of Standard and
Technology), DOD (Department of Defense) began requiring that universities, labs and
institutes applying for grants show industrial interest in their work. The industrial view
(although still in minority but strong among top industrial leaders) is that the current
dynamics of innovation forces firms to complement their competencies and to transform
new technological and scientific discoveries into products very fast and efficiently (see
Box 4). Universities and national labs are one of the critical pillars in networks that help
firms to operate efficiently in this system. This is due not only to the value of R&D at
these centers but also to the formation of critical human resources required to feed the
system. In this growing relationship between companies and universities, it is common
that large firms (IBM, AT&T, Ford, …) have agents that "bridge" between the two
worlds. Usually, these people have Ph.D. in Computer Science, Electrical Engineering,
Physics, Mathematics or Chemistry and sometimes have a stronger interaction and
identification with the academic world than with the companies to which they are
affiliated.
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Box 4 Main Topics of Research
In the knowledge economy, the value of knowledge is uneven, hierarchical and
dynamical. Thus, if we imagine knowledge quoted in an exchange market there would
be an ample spectrum of different "stocks" with their relative values changing at very
fast pace. Knowledge is hierarchical because any area of knowledge (e.g., non-linear
optics) contains sub-areas of knowledge, which in turn have uneven and dynamical
value. Of course, there is a basic infrastructure of technical knowledge common to
many diverse areas of technology. This infrastructure includes a strong background in
mathematics, information technology and physical sciences. In turn the capacity of
abstraction and synthesis rapidly begins to be more and more valuable. Let us
enumerate some of the areas whose "stocks" are currently highly valued. This means
that the "owners" of this knowledge can "sell" it (either as employees or as founders of
companies commercially exploiting the knowledge, or as professors/researchers in
universities/laboratories accessing to large grants). High-value areas include
communication networks (local-area networks, wide-area networks and metropolitan-
area networks), technologies for fast access to networks, communication protocols,
quality of service using the internet protocol, methodologies for designing and testing
chips, design automation tools, internet business models, network security,
                                             
20  The approach between these two communities with different views and philosophies required the
translation to very different languages and to overcome mutual mistrusts.
21 On the other hand, the current educational system has not made necessary
adjustments to facilitate the translation and transformation of knowledge from generic
into specific and vice versa.23
methodology and tools for developing software, methodology and tools for testing
complex software, new internet devices for communication/computation (integrating
telephone, TV, games, web browsing and email), chip fabrication technologies required
to guarantee "Moore Law" during the next few years, business models based on
exchange and integration of IP (intellectual property), DWDM (dense wave division
multiplexing) y other laser technologies to make more effective transmission through
optical fiber.
The current phase of development of the IT industry is characterized by a dramatic
reduction of the product lifetime. Firms are increasingly aware of their need to
complement their competency with groups of R&D from universities and national labs,
and in particular with groups of agents constituting start-ups and spin-offs that pursue
high-risk development. In this direction firms establish agreements with universities and
laboratories financed by government agencies such as NSF, NIST, DOD, etc. These
relationships are also encouraged by requirements for universities and laboratories to
establish stronger links with industry to access to grants. Moreover, since the break of the
of linear innovation model, academic centers recognize the importance of learning
processes outside traditional universities and large R&D labs. In fact, the development of
informal innovative activities in the high-tech industry is now, in many areas, at the
vanguard of the innovation process.
In the SV there is a very solid tradition of collaboration between academia and industry
which has generated a strong link between these communities. It could be said that the
relationship university-industry in the SV is in a more advanced phase of evolution as
compared with that in the rest of the country. In fact, as borders between firms in the
Valley are fuzzy and one could think of the Valley as a single firm with high mobility and
several coordinating agents, the separation between academy and industry is also fuzzy.
The generation of innovation and of new businesses does not recognize borders. These
activities are based on transactions where knowledge has much higher value than capital
as discussed in Box 4. Thus, many times professors and/or students of engineering,
computer sciences, biotechnology, applied physics and other technical areas from
Stanford, UC Berkeley and other local centers become entrepreneurs and start their own
companies or join existing start-ups, usually exploiting technologies developed by them.
On the other hand, entrepreneurs and venture capitalists become "academics" teaching
classes in local universities.
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3.3 Dynamics of the Innovation Process and of the Creation of Firms
                                             
22 In fact, the largest worldwide concentration of venture capital firms is along Sand Hill Road,
very close to Stanford campus in Palo Alto. Some of the most recognized VCs teach at the
School of Business. The departments of Engineering, Science and Business, the VC community
and local firms have strong interactions and many times Stanford University is a meeting center.
.24
In this section we explore the process for generating new businesses. Process starts with
an initial idea by a qualified team that later leads to the creation of a start-up. The firm
evolves in several possible ways concluding with a premature death, acquisition by a
larger firm or becoming public after an initial public offering (IPO).  Only a small
percentage of start-ups becomes public with a successful IPO, or is acquired by a larger
company for a hefty amount of money. Many start-ups never attract appropriate funds,
others end up with technologies that may already be outdated before release of their
products or even without acceptable products.  In the highly competitive environment of
the 1995-2000 period, investors usually recovered their investments as these ill-fated
companies typically still ended up acquired just for the technical team and/or some pieces
of the technology.
23  It is likely that after strong market adjustments that started in 2000
high-risk investment will again be high risk.
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The process usually starts with a small group of highly qualified people (founders) with a
good idea and (sometimes) knowledge of how to transform the idea into a company. Say,
it could start with 2 young Stanford professors and a couple of their best graduating
students, or a group of 2-4 engineers and a marketing specialist coming from different
companies of the Valley. All or some of them may know each other from previous jobs,
churches or social activities.  The founding group may not only have a good idea but also
a novel technology that can be patented, and a good experience on how to implement
their technology to bring a product to market, for example in the fiber optics field.
If the group has not yet raised money from venture capital it may try to start in an
incubator. There are many incubators located in the Silicon Valley. They usually provide
an infrastructure for starting companies, which may include furnished office space, fast
internet connection, receptionist, office equipment (copy and fax machines), usually at a
price below market. Some of the incubators are financed by the federal, state or local
government (or agencies such as NASA depending on the federal government) others are
private, instead. In these incubators, companies may pay low rent for space and other
infrastructure, but may give the host incubator some company equity. The group must
produce a business plan describing how to establish the company (including founders'
bios, technology, market, competition analysis, hiring plan and other details about the
company). It must be shown that the technology and business model of the start-up gives
it a competitive advantage in usually highly contested markets. In addition to (or as part
of) the business plan there is also a financial plan that discusses the money flow during
usually the first 5 years of the company.
The group is planning to raise 60 millions in three rounds in exchange for company
equity. In the first round, the company would like to get about 10 million, 20 more in the
second round at the end of the first year, and an additional 30 million in the third round at
the end of the second year. The next step is to attract the best investors. Venture capital
                                             
23 Also some acquisitions are driven not by the buyer planning to use the technology of the
acquired company but because the buying company would like to avoid that competitors access
the start-up technology.
24 Failed companies could become worthless, at least in certain areas, as it would be easier to
assemble technical teams.  In the medium to long term we still expect that there will be high
demand for qualified manpower.25
and angel provide not just money but many other important benefits. Thus, it is not only
the quantity of money but also the quality of the investors. Top-tier VCs may provide, in
addition to the name recognition, help in recruiting a first class management team, good
contacts with customers and partners, and may help in the initial steps for the start-up to
transition to a solid company. Then, founders must identity the best VCs specialized in
their area of expertise. In exchange for the VC investment, the founders give investors
company equity. There is always a healthy pool of stocks reserved for the coming
employees. Possibly, at the end of the third round the founders may own 20% of the
company, employees (including the CEO and the rest of the management team) may have
another 20% and 60% of the company is owned by the investors.
After the first round of investment, the company grows from the initial 4-6 founders to
about 50 people at the end of the first year, and about 90 at the end of the second year. At
the end of the third year, after company's products have been in the market for over a year
and conquest a significant percentage of the market, the company may go public in a
successful IPO. Alternatively the company may have been sold at the end of the second
year. In general, the buying company retains the IP (intellectual property) that includes
the patent portfolio, and all technical employees (and some of the marketing/sales team)
that are now encouraged to stay in the acquiring company for at least a year by offering
them stock options. Typically, the most innovative and entrepreneurial people of the
acquired team would leave the buying company after a year or two and then either start a
new company or become angels or VC investing in other companies. In any case, these
creative destruction dynamics increases the competency of technical and financial
services and the development of more and highly efficient companies, recycling and
circulating knowledge and fueling the economic development of the SV. 
25 In general
these new VCs are highly competent professionals with a rich diversity of backgrounds
(engineers, marketing, sales, finance…) and a extensive experience working in high-
technology, usually in the SV.
4. Conclusions
The dynamics of business creation in the SV shows that the local environment can
become a critical source of knowledge generation, circulation and processing. In turn, this
knowledge is the fuel of local companies helping them to acquire competitive advantages
benefiting companies of all sizes, but more in particular, the generation of new ventures.
Currently, most technological innovations are brought by start-ups. The big players now
understand this dynamics and are becoming increasingly active in financing new
ventures. Usually those who develop ideas are not the same as those who invest in these
                                             
25 The most dynamical agents of the local system are the "stars", "good players", venture
capitalists, recruiters and coaches. The stars are the best engineers, highly creative and with
acute business vision. In addition, “stars” may include outstanding marketing and sales agents
with powerful connections in a SV network. The venture capitalists provide not only money but
also direction and connections. Recruiters could be headhunters or even the same VCs that bring
very valuable people to the team. Finally, the coaches are advisors, people with long years of
technical, business or financial experience, and many times with prior experience in putting
together new companies. Some of them could be part of the boards of directors or advisors.26
ideas. In general, the implementation and execution of new ideas and projects is possible
thanks to the financial and organizational contributions of venture capitalists,
corporations and angels. These agents usually have technical or business expertise in
high-tech ventures.
Investments proceed in function of the power of the ideas, team and execution and do not
required collateral. The fast pace at which companies are created, evolve, become public
or part of a larger company can only be explained from the previous history of the region
whose main elements include i) partnership among private firms and collaboration of
companies, universities, national labs, and government, ii) partition of work into projects
usually involving a variety of expertise from many different departments (and/or
companies) and that usually do not last more than 3 years, iii) existence of a culture that
highly values the circulation of (codified and tacit) knowledge and does not disapprove
persons/organizations that did not succeeded in an activity, but rewards the learning
experience of unsuccessful projects and iv) agents that transmit information and connect
demand with offer in different markets, An important difference with other local systems,
industrial districts or clusters is that the SV develops high-tech activities at the
technological edge enabling innovations and creating competitive advantages that will be
critical in the next few decades.27
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